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The Monetary Transmission 
Mechanism: Some Answers 
and Further Questions
Introduction
hat are the mechanisms through which Federal Reserve 
policy affects the economy? And has financial 
innovation in recent years affected the monetary transmission 
mechanism, either by changing the overall impact of policy or 
by altering the channels through which it operates? These 
were the questions examined by the conference Financial 
Innovation and Monetary Transmission, sponsored by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York on April 5 and 6, 2001.1 Our 
goal in this overview is to summarize the conference papers and 
distill from them some tentative answers to the questions posed 
at the outset.
The overall conclusion drawn from the research presented is 
that monetary policy appears to have less of an impact on real 
activity than it once had—but the cause of that change remains 
an open issue. The conference papers explored three 
hypotheses en route to that finding. First, the transmission 
mechanism may have changed as a result of the financial 
innovations that motivated the conference, such as the growth 
of securitization, shifts between sources of financing for 
residential investment, or changes in the strength of wealth 
effects. Second, a change in the conduct of monetary policy 
may explain what appears to be a change in the effectiveness of 
policy. Finally, the fundamental structural changes affecting 
the economy’s stability (and by implication, monetary 
transmission) may be nonfinancial in nature. Also emerging 
from the discussions was the consensus that a useful area for 
future research is to determine more precisely the role of each 
hypothesis in the evolution of the monetary transmission 
mechanism.
Negative findings are often as informative as positive ones, 
however, and the conference succeeded in identifying three areas 
where financial innovation has left the monetary transmission 
mechanism largely unchanged. The first of these areas is the 
reserves market, which has changed profoundly in recent years as 
lower reserve requirements, higher vault cash holdings, and 
innovations such as sweep accounts have dramatically reduced 
the size of aggregate reserve balances. Yet despite these changes, 
the Fed has retained its ability to influence overnight interest 
rates—and indeed has generally succeeded in keeping the 
effective federal funds rate closer to its target than in years past. 
Changes in the reserves market therefore may have had a 
significant effect on the day-to-day implementation of policy, but 
they have not diminished the Trading Desk’s leverage over short-
term interest rates. Second, there is no evidence to suggest that 
the quantitative importance of the wealth channel has changed 
much in recent years. Its contribution to the impact of monetary 
policy has always been modest, and that contribution has, if 
anything, decreased somewhat since 1980. Third, while the 
parallel trends of financial consolidation and globalization have 
had a dramatic impact on financial services industries, thus far 
the trends appear to have had no perceptible effect on monetary 
transmission.
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A Monetary Transmission Schema
Monetary transmission is a complex and interesting topic 
because there is not one, but many, channels through which 
monetary policy operates. The exhibit depicts schematically an 
eclectic view of monetary policy transmission, identifying the 
major channels that have been distinguished in the literature.2 
The process begins with the transmission of open market 
operations to market interest rates, either through the reserves 
market or through the supply and demand for money more 
broadly. From there, transmission may proceed through any of 
several channels.
The interest rate channel is the primary mechanism at work in 
conventional macroeconomic models. The basic idea is 
straightforward: given some degree of price stickiness, an 
increase in nominal interest rates, for example, translates into an 
increase in the real rate of interest and the user cost of capital. 
These changes in turn lead to a postponement in consumption 
or a reduction in investment spending. This is precisely the 
mechanism embodied in conventional specifications of the “IS” 
curve—whether of the “Old Keynesian” variety, or the forward-
looking equations at the heart of the “New Keynesian” macro 
models developed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and 
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), among others. But as Bernanke 
and Gertler (1995) have pointed out, the macroeconomic 
response to policy-induced interest rate changes is considerably 
larger than that implied by conventional estimates of the interest 
elasticities of consumption and investment. This observation 
suggests that mechanisms other than the narrow interest rate 
channel may also be at work in the transmission of monetary 
policy.
One such alternative path is the wealth channel, built on the 
life-cycle model of consumption developed by Ando and 
Modigliani (1963), in which households’ wealth is a key 
determinant of consumption spending. The connection to 
monetary policy comes via the link between interest rates and 
asset prices: a policy-induced interest rate increase reduces the 
value of long-lived assets (stocks, bonds, and real estate), 
shrinking households’ resources and leading to a fall in 
consumption.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2002 17
Asset values also play an important role in the broad credit 
channel developed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), but in a 
manner distinct from that of the wealth channel. In the broad 
credit channel, asset prices are especially important in that they 
determine the value of the collateral that firms and consumers 
may present when obtaining a loan. In “frictionless” credit 
markets, a fall in the value of borrowers’ collateral will not 
affect investment decisions; but in the presence of information 
or agency costs, declining collateral values will increase the 
premium borrowers must pay for external finance, which in 
turn will reduce consumption and investment. Thus, the 
impact of policy-induced changes in interest rates may be 
magnified through this “financial accelerator” effect.
Like the broad credit channel, the narrow credit or bank 
lending channel relies on credit market frictions, but in this 
version, banks play a more central role. This idea goes back at 
least to Roosa (1951) and was restated in an influential paper by 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988). The essential insight is that 
because banks rely on reservable demand deposits as an 
important source of funds, contractionary monetary policy, by 
reducing the aggregate volume of bank reserves, will reduce the 
availability of bank loans. Because a significant subset of firms 
and households relies heavily or exclusively on bank financing, 
a reduction in loan supply will depress aggregate spending.
The exchange rate channel is an important element in 
conventional open-economy macroeconomic models, 
although it is often neglected in the closed-economy models 
typically applied to the United States. The chain of trans-
mission here runs from interest rates to the exchange rate via 
the uncovered interest rate parity condition relating interest 
rate differentials to expected exchange rate movements. Thus, 
an increase in the domestic interest rate, relative to foreign 
rates, would lead to a stronger currency and a reduction both 
in net exports and in the overall level of aggregate demand.
Finally, there is also what might be described as a monetarist 
channel—“monetarist” in the sense that it focuses on the direct 
effect of changes in the relative quantities of assets, rather than 
interest rates.3 The logic here is that because various assets are 
imperfect substitutes in investors’ portfolios, changes in the 
composition of outstanding assets brought about by monetary 
policy will lead to relative price changes, which in turn can have 
real effects. According to this view, interest rates play no special 
role other than as one of many relative asset prices. Although 
this mechanism is not part of the current generation of New 
Keynesian macro models, it is central to discussions of the 
likely effects of policy when, as in the case of Japan, there is a 
binding zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (see, for 
example, McCallum [2000]).
Needless to say, these channels are not mutually exclusive: 
the economy’s overall response to monetary policy will 
incorporate the impact of a variety of channels. In considering 
the possibility of changes in the transmission mechanism, 
however, it is useful to consider each one in turn. That is the 
approach taken by the papers in this volume, each of which 
focuses on a particular channel and the structural changes 
specific to it.
Three Measurement Challenges
It is a task for empirical research to assess the macroeconomic 
impact of the various channels of monetary transmission 
and to look for changes in the channels’ strength over time. 
Empirical work on these issues, however, immediately comes 
up against a number of challenges.
The first challenge is that of simultaneity. Typically, the 
Federal Reserve loosens policy when the economy weakens and 
tightens when the economy strengthens; this endogenous 
response of policy to economic conditions is one reason why it 
is difficult to identify the effects of policy. This pattern is 
illustrated by the correlations plotted in the top panel of the 
chart: over the 1954-2000 period, the correlation between real 
GDP and current and future (that is, negative lags of) funds 
rate changes is positive. This does not, of course, mean that 
interest rate increases are expansionary; rather, it reflects the 
tendency of the Fed to raise interest rates in response to 
unusually rapid real growth. The contractionary effect of 
higher rates is apparent only after a lag of two quarters, as 
shown by the negative correlation between GDP growth and 
funds rate changes lagged two quarters or more.
Even in this very simple view of the data, there is evidence that 
the link between policy and the economy has changed over time. 
Comparing the 1954-83 subsample (middle panel) with the 
1984-2000 subsample (bottom panel), we note two apparent 
differences. First, the correlation between output growth and 
subsequent funds rate changes is stronger in the later period—
evidence, perhaps, of more preemptive behavior on the part of 
the Fed. Second, the correlation between funds rate changes and 
subsequent quarters’ real GDP growth is weaker in the later 
period—near zero, in fact—lending plausibility to the notion 
that monetary policy has become less effective.
There is, however, an alternative explanation for the lower 
correlation between the funds rate and the real economy: 
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dampening real economic fluctuations. To illustrate this point, 
we consider an extreme example. Suppose monetary policy 
could be used to offset completely any fluctuations in real GDP 
growth (leaving aside questions of whether this outcome is 
either feasible or desirable), so that GDP expanded at a 
constant rate. If GDP growth were completely stable, then it 
would not be correlated with movements in the funds rate. 
In the real world, of course, monetary policy did not (and can 
not) keep output growth constant, but greater success in using 
policy to stabilize output fluctuations could account for the 
decline in the correlation between GDP growth and the funds 
rate seen in the bottom panel of the chart. The two alternative 
interpretations of the chart demonstrate why the simultaneity 
problem creates a serious challenge for the interpretation of 
any changes in the observed relationship between monetary 
policy and the economy.
Economists have employed a variety of techniques to solve 
the simultaneity problem, but none is entirely satisfactory. 
Perhaps the most common approach, and one employed by 
several papers in this volume, is to use a vector autoregression 
(VAR) model to purge interest rate changes of systematic 
responses to economic activity and to focus instead on the 
response to exogenous monetary policy “shocks.” Typically, 
this is done by exploiting the presumed lag between policy and 
its effects on real activity, which is apparent from the chart. 
(Since financial markets respond immediately to policy, a 
nonrecursive structure is more appropriate for modeling asset 
prices.) However, critics of the VAR approach find it 
implausible that the Federal Reserve behaves randomly, and 
argue that the shocks really represent either model 
specification errors or changes in the overall policy regime.4 In 
addition, the VARs’ focus on shocks makes it hard to use them 
to analyze changes in the systematic element of monetary 
policy.5 Nonetheless, the method remains popular because it 
offers a straightforward solution to the simultaneity problem 
and appears to yield a reasonable characterization of the 
economy’s response to monetary policy.
Another way around the simultaneity problem is to use 
economic models with an explicit theoretical foundation, 
calibrated in such a way as to approximate the behavior of the 
economy.6 This approach, employed by two of the conference 
papers, is much more amenable to the analysis of the types 
of “what if” counterfactuals that arise in the context of 
investigating the transmission mechanism. Even these models, 
however, ultimately rely on estimates of economic parameters, 
and the simultaneity issue must be confronted at this stage. 
Hence, calibrated theory-based models are a useful 
complement to econometric models like VARs but cannot 
altogether substitute for them.
Microeconomic approaches offer yet another way to 
circumvent the simultaneity problem, but these too are fraught 
with difficulties. Firm-level studies, for example, have been 
used to estimate the interest and cash flow sensitivities of 
investment spending and thereby assess the strength of the 
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sectional or within-firm differences in the user cost of capital, 
they eliminate the macro-level simultaneity problem described 
above. But firms’ financing decisions can affect the user cost, 
and this introduces a degree of micro-level endogeneity that 
can complicate the interpretation of the results. The 
microeconomic approach has also been effectively deployed in 
assessing the bank lending channel, notably by Kashyap and 
Stein (2000). But here too micro-level endogeneity can be a 
problem, particularly when relationships with banks’ other 
choice variables, such as holdings of liquid assets, are involved. 
Furthermore, with any micro study, extrapolating from micro-
level results to macro-level effects will inevitably depend on 
assumptions about the response of market participants. A 
disproportionate impact of monetary policy on a particular 
group of firms, for example, will have no macro effect if 
other firms in the economy are able to “take up the slack.” 
Ultimately, cross-sectional studies using micro data are 
probably more informative about the micro-level distribution 
of responses than they are about the overall macroeconomic 
impact.
The second challenge in assessing the strength of any 
particular channel of monetary transmission comes from the 
concurrent operation of multiple channels. For example, 
because we typically observe a fall in both output and bank 
lending after a policy-induced increase in interest rates, it is 
hard to tell how much of the loan decline to attribute to a 
decline in loan demand (resulting from the interest rate 
increase) and how much to the reduction in loan supply 
implied by the bank lending channel. An analogous problem 
confronts attempts to assess the strength of the wealth channel. 
A common, if not entirely satisfactory, solution to this problem 
is to compare policy’s estimated effect with its impact, with the 
channel in question econometrically “turned off.” If the 
remaining equations are assumed to be unchanged by this 
intervention, then the difference between the two responses 
can be interpreted as a gauge of the channel’s contribution.
Adding to these two challenges is the problem of isolating a 
change in the strength of the channels of monetary 
transmission. This problem is particularly daunting for a 
number of the studies in this volume, thanks to the 
evolutionary nature of the changes under consideration. 
Changes in the use of securitization, the disintermediation of 
credit formation, households’ equity holdings, and the 
financing of residential investment have all proceeded 
gradually, as has the consolidation in the financial services 
industry. Consequently, their effects on the transmission 
mechanism, if any, will only become evident over relatively 
long periods of time. Unfortunately, standard statistical 
methods for detecting structural change work best for distinct, 
abrupt events, such as the October 1979 shift in Fed operating 
procedures or the oil shock of late 1973. Structural changes in 
the monetary transmission mechanism have tended to be more 
evolutionary; moreover, many of these changes have occurred 
concurrently, making it even more difficult to separate out 
their effects cleanly. Therefore, the scope for formal tests of 
structural change is rather limited, and the studies in this 
volume instead tend to emphasize assessments of the economic 
(as opposed to statistical) significance of the changes.
Survey and Synthesis
Taken together, the papers presented indicate that there have 
indeed been significant changes in the linkages between the 
basic instrument of monetary policy—reserves—and macro-
economic outcomes. But these changes do not necessarily 
imply a change in the efficacy of policy. Reasons for these 
changes can be found at two stages: first, in the linkages 
between reserves and interest rates (the top half of the exhibit) 
and second, in the connection between interest rates and 
economic activity.
From Reserves to Interest Rates
The epicenter of monetary policy in the United States is the 
reserves market: it is here that the overnight interest rate 
targeted by the Fed is determined and open market operations 
have their impact. Sandra Krieger’s contribution to the volume 
provides an overview of some of the changes that have taken 
place in this market in recent years, and in particular, the 
declining volume of reserve balances and the diminishing 
reliance on open market operations to effect rate changes. 
Reasons for the decline in reserve balances include the decline 
in required reserves as well as the adoption of “sweep accounts” 
in the mid-1990s. In their paper, Paul Bennett and Stavros 
Peristiani show that one side effect of these trends is that 
reserve requirements are no longer binding for many banks, 
and that this has weakened the link between the fed funds rate 
and banks’ desired reserve balances.
The implications of these changes for the link between open 
market operations and interest rates are documented 
empirically by Selva Demiralp and Oscar Jordá. Their main 
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were accompanied by systematic patterns in open market 
operations. These patterns are no longer evident after 1994, yet 
the effective federal funds rate seems to track its target more 
closely than it did in the past. Meanwhile, the timing of 
announced policy changes seems to have become a factor in the 
response of term interest rates. From this evidence, Demiralp 
and Jordá conclude that “announcement effects” have taken on 
increased importance in recent years. These findings challenge 
the conventional view that open market operations are central 
to the implementation of policy changes, but they are 
consistent with Krieger’s description of the process.
Observing these trends, one could argue that the trends’ 
continuation could eventually undermine altogether the Fed’s 
leverage over interest rates. Contributions by Michael 
Woodford and by Marvin Goodfriend address this possibility 
at a conceptual level. Each paper starts with the observation 
that recent innovations to reserve management have decreased 
the demand for the level of reserves, and that this may 
eventually create some technical difficulties for Desk 
operations. Neither author sees these innovations as a 
fundamental threat to the Fed’s ability to influence interest 
rates, however, and both note that further erosion in reserve 
demand could easily be offset by changes to Desk operating 
procedures. Based on other central banks’ experience, 
Woodford suggests that a “corridor” system with interest-
bearing reserves and a Lombard-style lending facility would 
effectively solve any foreseeable problems created by the 
further evaporation in reserve demand. Goodfriend’s proposal 
also involves interest-bearing reserves, but differs from 
Woodford’s by envisioning an expansion in the level of reserves 
sufficient to satiate the market. The result would be a system 
that, in theory, allows for separate control over both the 
overnight interest rate and the quantity of bank reserves.
Interest Rates and Output
The relationship between the Federal Reserve’s target federal 
funds rate and the behavior of the macroeconomy is the subject 
tackled by another group of papers. The volatility of real GDP 
has declined markedly since the mid-1980s, as documented by 
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000). In this volume, Jean 
Boivin and Marc Giannoni show that the economy’s response 
to monetary policy also appears to have declined over roughly 
the same period.7 What was responsible for these changes? Are 
changes in the transmission mechanism responsible, or were 
they brought about by a change in the conduct of monetary 
policy? Or was the cause perhaps some other structural change 
in the economy, such as an innovation in firms’ management 
of inventories with monetary policy passively responding?
In thinking about this question, it is useful to recall the 
Frisch (1933) distinction between shocks and propagation: a 
change in volatility may come about either because the size 
of the shocks has diminished or because of weaker 
propagation. Monetary transmission can be thought of as 
encompassing the various ways in which monetary policy 
shocks propagate through the economy. But monetary policy 
is more than just a source of shocks: the systematic response 
of policy to macroeconomic conditions also affects the 
propagation of monetary (and other) shocks. A more 
strongly countercyclical policy, for example, will attenuate 
the impact of shocks on output.
Boivin and Giannoni address this “shocks-versus-
propagation” issue directly, using a VAR analysis to assess the 
effects of the reduced size of monetary shocks, changes in 
monetary propagation, and other changes in the economic 
environment. They find that the variance of monetary policy 
shocks has indeed declined sharply since the early 1980s, but 
this decline cannot account for the reduced volatility of output. 
Instead, a change in the systematic response of policy to 
macroeconomic conditions (a greater degree of “leaning 
against the wind”) seems to account for most of the diminished 
response to the shocks in their VAR. By implication, this 
finding casts doubt on nonpolicy explanations for the 
attenuation.8
Monetary policy is not the only factor in the propagation of 
shocks, of course; other changes in the economic environment 
may be at work as well. James Kahn, Margaret McConnell, and 
Gabriel Perez-Quiros analyze the possible role of inventories, 
which have historically been a major contributor to 
macroeconomic volatility. The authors’ hypothesis is that 
better inventory management, which has been made possible 
by improvements in information technology, has attenuated 
the propagation of demand shocks through inventories. 
Specifically, the technology has allowed firms to anticipate sales 
fluctuations better, so that production responds more 
quickly—but less sharply—to sales fluctuations. Using 
simulations of a small equilibrium model, the authors show 
that such a change in inventory behavior can account for the 
observed behavior of output and inventories, whereas a change 
in the monetary policy rule cannot. These results stand in 
contrast to those of Boivin and Giannoni, who ascribe a greater 
role for monetary policy. The sharp differences in the papers’ 
findings exemplify the difficulties in measuring and testing for 
changes in the transmission mechanism discussed earlier. 
Further research using a framework that nests the two papers’ 
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Financial Intermediation
In the past twenty years, a number of significant regulatory 
and structural changes in the financial system have affected 
monetary policy transmission. Regulatory changes—such as 
the repeal of Regulation Q in the early 1980s and the bank 
capital requirements mandated by the Basle Accord in 1988 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act in 1991— dramatically altered the incentives and the ability 
of banks to lend as policy changed. Moreover, the steady 
diminution of banks’ role in credit formation in the United 
States—both via direct borrowing in financial markets and via 
securitization of financial institution assets—has been 
associated with increased competition in many lending 
markets and has increased the importance of the price of credit 
in the transmission mechanism. While most of the regulatory 
and structural changes have reduced the importance of 
outright credit rationing, their overall impact on the 
transmission mechanism remains an open question.
Several papers in this volume consider the role of financial 
intermediation in the transmission of monetary policy. In one, 
Cara Lown and Donald Morgan directly examine the role of 
bank lending standards to businesses as a determinant of real 
economic activity, and provide new evidence on banks’ 
relevance to the transmission mechanism. Using a VAR 
approach, they find that lending standards have important 
predictive power for both loan volume and economic output. 
These results provide strong support for the view that shocks 
to bank lending are important, but because monetary policy has 
little effect on lending standards, they give less support for the 
bank lending channel as a central part of the transmission 
mechanism. Lown and Morgan do, however, find that when 
lending standards are added to the VAR model, they partially 
displace monetary policy shocks in predicting real economic 
activity. The authors hypothesize that this result reflects 
policymakers’ use of “moral suasion” to reduce credit 
formation during periods of monetary policy tightening. 
The use of moral suasion has become less common in recent 
years, however, raising the question whether lending standards 
will continue to predict economic activity going forward; 
tentative results for the 1990s, however, suggest that standards 
have retained their predictive power. This raises the possibility 
that bank lending standards may be a proxy for broader credit 
conditions at other financial institutions and in financial 
markets. If so, then the continued predictive content of 
standards is somewhat less surprising.
The effects of securitization are examined by Arturo Estrella, 
who considers the degree to which asset securitization—and 
mortgage securitization in particular—have affected the 
transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. Using an 
estimated structural IS equation, he finds that the sensitivity 
of both real output and housing investment to the real federal 
funds rate declined significantly as the degree of asset securiti-
zation increased in the 1980s and 1990s. Because the sensitivity 
of mortgage interest rates to fed funds changes has, if anything, 
increased, he suggests that securitization has largely affected 
those channels not directly related to interest rates, such as the 
bank lending or credit channels.
Jonathan McCarthy and Richard Peach also study 
securitization’s effects, but they focus more directly on the 
housing market, using a structural model of housing 
investment to examine how regulatory changes and other 
innovations in housing finance have affected the transmission 
of policy shocks to housing investment. Like Estrella, they find 
that interest rates—as opposed to quantity constraints—have 
taken on a larger role since the dismantling of Regulation Q 
and the shift from thrift-based intermediation to a more 
market-oriented system of housing finance. Perhaps as a 
consequence of these changes, mortgage interest rates now 
respond more quickly to monetary policy than they did prior 
to 1986. Residential investment, however, responds more 
slowly, and now fluctuates more or less concurrently with the 
overall level of economic activity. An important implication of 
the McCarthy-Peach paper is that the housing sector is no 
longer in the vanguard of monetary transmission.
Skander Van den Heuvel and William English are more 
forward-looking in their outlooks. The authors focus on two 
factors—bank capital requirements and consolidation in the 
financial services industry, respectively—that may well have 
significant effects on the transmission mechanism, but have 
received little attention from researchers to date. English 
discusses how the inexorable trend toward consolidation in the 
financial industry might affect both the implementation and 
the transmission of monetary policy. He zeroes in on the ways 
in which consolidation might undermine central banks’ ability 
to implement monetary policy and how the size and timing of 
policy’s effects may change as the financial system becomes 
increasingly dominated by a small number of very large 
institutions. These concerns appear to be largely unwarranted, 
at least at present. A recent collaborative study by the Group of 
Ten central banks, summarized by English, suggests that 
financial consolidation has thus far had small effects on the 
implementation of policy and virtually no effect on the 
transmission of policy changes through the financial system.
Van den Heuvel probes the role of bank capital and capital 
requirements in the transmission mechanism, and proposes a 
“bank capital” channel of monetary policy. This channel is 
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involves policy-induced changes in bank loan supply. Instead 
of viewing bank reserves as the relevant binding constraint, 
however, it emphasizes the role of banks’ capital structure in 
shaping the response of policy-induced interest rate changes. 
Because poorly capitalized banks are less likely to lend than 
well-capitalized institutions, the macroeconomic impact of 
policy’s effects through the bank capital channel will depend on 
both the distribution and the level of bank capital ratios when 
the policy change occurs. Bank capital requirements may 
therefore interact with monetary policy in subtle and hard-to-
predict ways. Moreover, to the extent that it affects banks’ 
exposure to interest rate risk, the maturity distribution of bank 
assets will also affect the transmission of policy.
The Role of Asset Prices
The transmission of monetary policy through asset prices is 
analyzed from two different angles. Sydney Ludvigson, Charles 
Steindel, and Martin Lettau scrutinize the empirical basis for 
the wealth channel in the United States; Kosuke Aoki, James 
Proudman, and Gertjan Vlieghe also analyze the role of wealth 
in monetary transmission, but in the context of the broad 
credit channel.
Using a structural VAR model, Ludvigson, Steindel, and 
Lettau examine the response to federal funds rate shocks; to 
assess the strength of the wealth channel, they compare the 
estimated impact on consumption with the impact assuming 
no response of asset prices. The authors find only small 
differences in the response of consumption, and conclude from 
this that the wealth channel is weak—much weaker than it is in 
conventional structural macro models. In fact, their evidence 
suggests that the wealth channel is slightly weaker now than it 
was in the 1960s and 1970s, despite the growing importance of 
equities in households’ portfolios. The reason for this may be 
attributed to the transitory nature of asset values’ response to 
funds rate shocks and the fact that consumption responds 
strongly only to more permanent changes in wealth. The 
Ludvigson-Steindel-Lettau findings suggest that rather than a 
causal link from monetary policy to consumption by way of 
asset prices, the apparent relationship between the three 
variables may reflect the simultaneous response of asset values 
and monetary policy to common, underlying inflation 
pressures.
In their study, Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe assess the 
impact of monetary policy on the real economy through its 
effect on housing prices, using a variant of the financial 
accelerator model developed by Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Gilchrist (1999) calibrated to U.K. data. The Aoki-Proudman-
Vlieghe model indicates that policy-induced changes in house 
prices have in fact played a significant role in the transmission 
of monetary policy in the United Kingdom. The authors also 
find that recent financial innovations, such as more flexible 
refinancing terms and increased consumer access to unsecured 
credit, may have altered the transmission mechanism via 
housing prices. Easier access to housing collateral in particular 
has raised the sensitivity of consumption to house prices and 
policy shocks, while increased access to credit cards has 
weakened the link. Overall, the paper concludes that monetary 
policy shocks now have smaller effects on housing investment 
and housing prices in the United Kingdom, but slightly larger 
effects on consumption.
Conclusions and Open Questions
A number of broad policy conclusions can be drawn from the 
papers collected in this volume:
• Monetary policy’s effects appear to be somewhat weaker 
than they were in past decades. Financial innovation is 
one possible cause of this change, but not the only one: 
improved inventory management and the conduct of 
monetary policy itself are others.
• Thanks to financial innovation and institutional changes 
in housing finance, the housing sector is no longer on 
the leading edge of the transmission mechanism. 
However, judging from the evidence presented for the 
United Kingdom, the role of housing assets on 
households’ balance sheets warrants further study.
• Neither financial consolidation nor the shrinking reserve 
volume appears to be a major factor affecting monetary 
transmission—at least not yet.
Some loose ends and lacunae remain, however. First, 
although monetary policy seems to have retained its 
effectiveness, the economy’s sensitivity to interest rates remains 
an open question. A comparison of the Estrella and Boivin-
Giannoni papers illustrates this issue. Both find that the 
response of real activity to interest rates has diminished, 
Estrella using a “structural” IS equation and Boivin and 
Giannoni in the context of a monetary VAR. Estrella attributes 
this to a change in intermediation brought about by securiti-
zation, and as Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros suggest, 
improved inventory management may also have played a role. 
Yet as Boivin and Giannoni show, the diminished response 
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from the endogenous reaction of monetary policy. We thus 
return to the simultaneity question: how is it possible to isolate 
the effect of interest rates on economic conditions when 
interest rates are themselves a function of economic conditions?
Second, given the decline in the relative importance of 
banking, the corresponding growth in securitized lending 
described by Estrella resists easy explanation, as do the changes 
in housing finance documented by McCarthy and Peach and 
the durability of the predictive content of bank lending 
standards shown by Lown and Morgan.
Third, the absence of attention to an open-economy 
channel running through the exchange rate is an important 
lacuna. The omission does not mean that this channel is 
unimportant; indeed, movements in net exports have played 
an increasingly large role in U.S. macroeconomic fluctuations. 
But a firm connection between economic fundamentals and 
short-run exchange rate movements continues to elude 
researchers, and this has frustrated efforts to pin down the 
exchange rate channel empirically.9
These are, of course, not the only questions left unanswered 
by the research presented at this conference, and the evolution 
of the economy and the financial system is sure to raise new 
questions. Consequently, the monetary transmission 
mechanism will continue to be an important and fruitful area 
for future research.Endnotes
24 The Monetary Transmission Mechanism
1. The contents of this volume are also available at
<www.newyorkfed.org/rmaghome/econ_pol/2002/>.
2. A similar description of the channels of monetary transmission 
appears in Mishkin (1995).
3. Meltzer (1995) summarizes this viewpoint. This monetarist 
channel is similar in spirit, but considerably more sophisticated than 
the earlier strand of monetarist thought based on the equation of 
exchange, MV=PY.
4. Cochrane (1994) and Rudebusch (1998), among others, have made 
these points.
5. Hard, but not impossible: see Boivin and Giannoni (2002b), 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997), and Sims and Zha (1995). 
Hoover and Jordá (2001) provide a review and propose an alternative 
method for assessing the effects of systematic policy.
6. The most commonly used models for this purpose are the New 
Keynesian variety, such as those based on Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1997) and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999).
7. The decline in the response of output to monetary policy is also 
documented by Taylor (1995), who uses an estimated structural 
model of the economy.
8. In a separate paper, Boivin and Giannoni (2002a) consider non-
policy sources of structural change more rigorously, but find that the 
sources fail to provide a satisfactory explanation for the observed 
change in the economy’s behavior.
9. See, for example, Flood and Rose (1995, 1999) and Kuttner and 
Posen (2001).References
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